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MUNICIPAL LAW IN MISSOURI*
T. E. LAUER**
In recent years the United States has experienced the pressure of a
quickly expanding population and the problems arising out of an in-
creasingly urban way of life. The basic changes in our society have been
severe; municipal law as a result has become one of the most active and
dynamic fields in the legal system, both with respect to legislation and to
adjudication. Missouri has not escaped the national trend. During the
period under study, from April 1962 until September 1963, approximately
fifty appellate court decisions dealing with municipal law were reported;
some of these have far-reaching ramifications. In addition, the 1963 session
of the Missouri General Assembly enacted important legislation dealing
with the powers and functions of municipalities.
I. LEISLATION BY MUNICIPALITIES
Section 77.080, RSMo 1959, relating to cities of the third class, pro-
vides that ordinances must be passed by bill, and "no bill shall become an
ordinance unless on its final passage a majority of the members elected
to the council shall vote therefor, and the ayes and nays shall be entered
on the journal."' In City of Independence v. Hare2 the holder of a special
sewer tax bill brought an action to enforce the lien of the tax bill. The
defendants asserted that the tax bill was void and uncollectable because
the journal of the Independence city council meeting at which the ordinance
levying and assessing the sewer tax was passed did not record the ayes
and nays, although it showed all twelve members to have been present.
The circuit court directed a verdict for the holder of the tax bill; defendants
filed a new trial motion and the city of Independence asked leave to
*This article contains a discussion of selected Missouri court decisions appear-
ing in volumes 357 to 370, inclusive, of the South Western Reporter, Second Series.
"Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. See also §§ 73.170, .190, RSMo 1959 (first class cities); § 75.180, RSMo
1959 (second class cities); § 78.580, RSMo 1959 (third class cities with city
manager government); § 79.130, RSMo 1959 (fourth class cities); § 80.110, RSMo
1959 (towns and villages).
2. 359 S.W.2d 33 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
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intervene, alleging that a majority of the council had in fact voted in
favor of the ordinance, and praying for leave to amend the journal nunc
pro tunc to show the ayes and nays. Both the new trial motion and the
city's motion were overruled; all parties appealed, defendants from the
adverse judgment and the city and holder of the bill from the denial to
intervene. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that the defendants'
appeal was meritorious, in that the requirement that the ayes and nays
be shown upon the journal was mandatory. However, the court also found
merit in the argument that the city should have been allowed to intervene,
due to the fact that the validity of the ordinance was a matter affecting
the public interest.3 Because it would not be "a change in the record but
rather an expansion to show in detail the actual vote,"4 the nunc pro tunc
amendment of the journal was within the court's discretion. The judgment
was reversed and the cause remanded to allow intervention and a hearing
on the merits as to amendment of the journal.
Conflict of interest can be a serious problem on the municipal level, as
well as in the state and national capitals. One of the most troublesome
problems arising out of an alleged conflict of interest upon the part of a
city councilman or alderman is whether, in the absence of controlling
legislation, the courts will hold that judicial propriety extends to a con-
sideration of the conflict as affecting the validity of an ordinance or
regulation.5 The question was raised in Coffin v. City of Lee's Snmmrit,6
where a judgment was sought declaring a rezoning ordinance void because
two of the six members of the board of aldermen had in its passage a
"direct, personal, financial or pecuniary interest." The ordinance rezoned
a tract of 140 acres from a residential classification to one which would
permit quarrying. The tract was owned by Union Construction Company,
which engaged in quarrying, rock-crushing and similar activities. One
alderman was president of and owned one-third of the stock of a ready-mix
concrete company; Union Construction owned the balance of the stock.
3. Citing § 507.090(3) (4), RSMo 1959, giving the court discretionary power
to allow intervention by a governmental subdivision when the validity of an ordi-
nance or regulation affecting the public interest is in question. Mo. R. Civ. P.
52.11(c) (4) is similar.
4. 359 S.W.2d at 37.
5. For a general view of the decisions from other states in cases involving
zoning matters, see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 568 (1960), which indicates that in most
states where the question has been considered, the courts have declined to inquire
into the motives of municipal legislators.
6. 357 S.W.2d 211 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962). In the opinion, Judge Hunter re-
views at length the leading decisions from other states.
[Vol. 28
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss4/4
MUNICIPAL LAW IN MISSOURI
The concrete company operated from Union's place of business, although
the opinion is silent as to the scope and nature of the relationship between
the two companies. The other alderman was employed as a truck driver
for a concern which hauled materials for both the ready-mix company
and for Union Construction. The circuit court found that the interest of
the aldermen was such as to invalidate the rezoning ordinance as being
against public policy. On appeal, the judgment was reversed. The Kansas
City Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Hunter, acknowledged that
the question was one of first impression in Missouri, but found it un-
necessary to decide whether the courts would act where a conflict existed
on the part of an alderman discharging a legislative function, for the
reason that the evidence fell "short of demonstrating that either of the
two Aldermen had a direct financial interest in the passage of the or-
dinance."17 Moreover, any other interest the aldermen may have had was
not direct, but "indirect and remote," and insufficient to compel the
court, in the public interest, to determine whether the ordinance should
be struck down.8
Three decisions involved the use of the initiative and the referendum
in municipal legislation. In State ex rel. Sessions v. Bartle,9 a mandamus
action was brought in Kansas City to compel submission to the voters of
an ordinance, proposed by initiative petitions, which would have classified
various positions held by city employees and established salary scales for
these positions. It was estimated that the ordinance would increase city
salaries by as much as $500,000 per year. The measure provided no means
for raising the additional revenue to meet this expense. The Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for defendants, holding that the
proposed ordinance was in effect an appropriation measure and therefore
violated Article III, Section 51 of the Missouri Constitution: "The initiative
7. Id. at 217.
8. Viewed from the groves of academe, the conflict of interest problem
appears to be a very real and serious one, and the courts have by and large been
far too timorous in their approach to it. Certainly it is difficult to believe that the
city council or other legislative body could or would effectively police itself, and
the futility of depending upon the response of the electorate at the ballot box has
been all too often demonstrated. As to the hallowed notion of separation of powers,
it should be noted that this is a doctrine which is all but completely judge-made,
and that its extension beyond the legislature to municipal bodies is wholly unwar-
ranted. Certainly the city council is not a branch of government coordinate with
and equal to the courts; this much, at least, is plainly set forth in State ex inf.
Dalton v. Harris, 363 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1962), discussed infra at note 27.
9. 359 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. 1962).
19631
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shall not be used for the appropriation of money other than of new revenues
created and provided for thereby...."
A more vexing problem of the initiative was presented in State ex rel.
Powers v. Donolkue, ° where an amendment to the St. Louis County zoning
ordinance was proposed by the initiative process.11 In an en banc opinion
by Judge Hollingsworth, the supreme court acknowledged that the Missouri
Constitution reserves to the people the use of the initiative,, 2 but held
that in this case the initiative was further defined and restricted by the
Charter of St. Louis County and by the ordinances enacted thereunder
setting forth the procedures to be followed in zoning matters. The use of
the initiative to propose ordinances, said the court, is subject to the same
restrictions which are placed upon the council in the passage of similar
ordinances.1 3 The court set out a number of St. Louis County Charter
provisions relating to the initiative, the classification of zoning law amend-
ments as emergency measures, the powers of the county council relating
to zoning, and the functions of the planning commission relating to zoning
ordinances. Further, county ordinances requiring notice and a hearing in
all zoning law changes by the county council were quoted; the court clearly
felt that these restrictions upon the council's power to act applied also
to ordinances proposed by the initiative. The court concluded that the
notice and hearing requirement had not been met in this case, and therefore
the proposed ordinance, if enacted by a vote of the people, would be void.
10. 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. En Banc 1963). Procedurally, the decision involved
two consolidated actions; the litigation had begun in circuit court as a mandamus
proceeding to compel the ordinance to be placed upon the ballot, and a peremptory
writ of mandamus had issued. Thereupon defendants and intervenors appealed,
and at the same time filed in the Missouri Supreme Court an original action to
prohibit the trial court from enforcing the writ of mandamus. The supreme court
consolidated the actions for hearing.
11. The dispute arose out of a rezoning by the St. Louis County Council of
225 acres from a residential classification to a heavy industrial classification to
permit quarrying. Opponents of the rezoning first sought to use the referendum
procedure to challenge the council's action, but abandoned the referendum (prob-
ably due to St. Louis County Charter provisions denying the use of the referendum
as to emergency measures, including zoning ordinance amendments) and circulated
the initiative petitions which gave rise to the mandamus action.
12. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 49-52. The constitutional provisions pertain spe-
cifically to the use of the initiative to propose statutes and constitutional amend-
ments; to what extent the provisions apply to legislation by units of local govern-
ment has not been fully established. Cf. Kansas City v. McGee, 364 Mo. 896, 269
S.W.2d 662 (1954).
13. Citing Baum v. City of St. Louis, 343 Mo. 738, 123 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1938):
"Restrictions on the power of the Board of Aldermen of a city to enact ordinances
are as a rule applicable to proposals under the initiative provisions."
[Vol. 28
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From a practical point of view the decision may be sound; there may
exist cogent reasons for not permitting zoning amendments by the use of
the initiative procedure. But viewed legally, from a consideration of the
charter provisions and ordinances involved, the decision is based upon
questionable grounds.1 ' In the first place, there appears to be nothing in
the Charter of St. Louis County which prevents zoning amendments from
being enacted by use of initiative proposals.15 Consequently, the only bar
14. In this connection, the reasoning of Judge Eager's concurring opinion
may provide a more acceptable basis for the decision:
I would prefer to put this holding upon the basic fact that the re-
spondents are attempting to accomplish by indirection that which they
are specifically prohibited from doing directly; that is to say, they may
not create any amendment to the zoning ordinance by referendum, but
in fact and in substance they are here seeking a referendum upon the
enactment of the prior ordinance. 368 S.WM2d at 439.
But would this reasoning be valid if the initiative petition had not been seeking to
undo a recent zoning amendment by the county council?
15. In its opinion, the court cited several county charter provisions, and
italicized portions thereof, but did not make it clear which, if any, of these pro-
visions prevented the use of the initiative for zoning matters, either expressly or
as a matter of implication. Nor does it appear that the charter provisions dictate
such a result. The provisions cited by the court were:
(1) Article VII, § 77, which reserves to the people "the power to propose and
enact or reject ordinances and amendments to this Charter, independent of the
Council." This article provides that the referendum shall not be employed in
emergency measures, but places no limitation upon the use of the initiative.
(2) Article III, § 18, defining emergency ordinances to include zoning ordi-
nance amendments. Again, this relates to the limitation on the referendum.
(3) Article III, § 22, authorizing the council by ordinance to engage in plan-
ning and zoning. The court may have felt that this provision placed zoning ex-
clusively within the power of the council; but this is a strained interpretation,
for within § 22 are enumerated all other subjects upon which the council may
legislate. It would be an absurdity to insist that the initiative may only be used
upon matters over which the council has the power to legislate, and then to argue
further that because the charter says that the council shall "have, by ordinance,
the power" to zone, that therefore this language should be read to mean that the
council's power to zone is exclusive. Nor is the argument helped by the language
that existing laws relating to planning and zoning shall remain in force "until
superseded by ordinances of the Council." Plainly the purpose of this clause is
to retain existing laws during the period between the adoption of the charter and
the time the council could effectively function; it should be given interim effect
only, and since the council thereafter did act, the clause has fulfilled its purpose.
(4) Article V, §§ 57 and 58, establishing the planning commission and provid-
ing that it should have the powers and duties provided by law, or by ordinance;
further, "No ordinance relating to zoning which is contrary to the recommendation
of a majority of the members of the Planning Commission shall be adopted by the
Council except by an affirmative vote of five members of the Council." This may
provide the strongest argument to be found within the charter against the use of
the initiative in this case. But note that it does not provide expressly that all
zoning ordinances be submitted to the planning commission, nor does it provide
that the recommendation of the planning commission is a prerequisite to the adop-
tion of such an ordinance. These requirements are present, if at all, only through
indirection. Compare Baum v. City of St. Louis, 343 Mo. 738, 123 S.W.2d 48 (1938),
19631
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to employing the initiative in this case must have been the failure to
comply with the notice and hearing requirement-a requirement which
would effectively prohibit the use of the initiative in all zoning amendments
for the reason that only the county council and. planning commission may
act to satisfy the requirement as it appears in the ordinance. And con-
sidering the nature of the initiative process, even substantial compliance
with the notice and hearing requirement is clearly impossible. In short,
the provisions of an ordinance enacted by the council (and which could
therefore presumably be repealed by the council) are said to impose a re-
striction upon the council which must be met not only by the council in
making zoning changes, but also by any initiative proposal which would
amend the zoning ordinance.
Two objections to this may be raised. First, Bawm v. City of St.
Louis,'0 the decision cited in support of the proposition that restrictions
upon the council are restrictions upon the initiative procedure, dealt not
with a limitation contained in an ordinance enacted by the governing body,
but with a limitation in the charter; the opinion speaks in terms of "re-
strictions on the power" of the council. (Emphasis added.) Plainly the court
there was speaking of limitations over which the municipal governing body
had no control.17 Second, if the right to the initiative has been reserved
to the people in both the state constitution and in the county charter, it
seems anomalous to permit the county council to destroy this right by
ordinance, through establishing, a procedure with which no initiative peti-
tion can comply.
The decision in the Donozue case may be correct if, aside from the
where the charter expressly provided "No ordinance for public work or improve-
ments of any kind, or repairs thereof, shall be adopted unless prepared and recom-
mended by the board of public service. . . ." Nor should the requirement of an
affirmative vote by five council members be held to bar the initiative. Against this
argument, which is made by heaping inference upon implication, stands the rela-
tively clear directive in the constitution and the charter reserving to the people
the right to propose legislation and ordinances. Unless this right is to become
nugatory, the courts must be willing, wherever possible, to give it the broadest
possible interpretation and application.
16. Supra note 13.
17. In the Baum case, the initiative petition proposed an ordinance "for the
acquisition of a five cent fare municipal mass transportation system." However,
under the city charter the St. Louis Board of Aldermen had no authority to adopt
such an ordinance unless it had first been recommended by the board of public
service. Since no such recommendation had been made, it was held that the
initiative, which was required to be exercised in accordance with the charter,
could not be used.
[Vol. 28
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charter and ordinances, there exist inherent limitations arising from the
nature of zoning amendments which would prohibit the use of the initiative
process. While it is clear that cities"' and non-charter counties' 9 are re-
quired by statute to give notice and. grant a hearing in proceedings for
zoning amendments, it has been held that the constitutional grant of power
to a charter county, such as St. Louis County, takes precedence over the
legislative power;20 therefore the statutory requirements are not binding
upon St. Louis County. On the other hand, if due process required notice and
a hearing in all zoning amendment proceedings, then clearly the initiative
procedure could not be used for such amendments, since it would be
plainly impracticable, if not impossible, to include these matters at a
stage of the initiative process.21 However, this question was not raised by
the court in the Donokue case, and seems not to have arisen in any other
Missouri decision.22
The use of the referendum procedure to submit to the voters of Kansas
City an ordinance enacted by the city council for the purchase of equip-
ment to be used in adding fluorides to the city water supply was considered
in State ex tel. Whittington V. Strakln.23 Referendum petitions were pre-
sented to the city clerk, and when she failed to act upon them, a mandamus
18. §§ 89.050, .060, RSMo 1959.
19. See, e.g., §§ 64.140, .271, .640, RSMo 1959.
20. Casper v. Hetlage, 359 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1962); State ex inf. Dalton v.
Gamble, 365 Mo. 215, 280 S.W.2d 656 (En Banc 1955).
21. The purpose of notice and hearing in proceedings to adopt or to amend
zoning ordinances should be considered. Clearly these legislative or quasi-legislative
proceedings are in no sense adjudications; the affected property owner has a right
to be notified of the impending change and to speak out in favor thereof or op-
position thereto. But unlike judicial proceedings, although there is a right to
speak, there is no guarantee that the speaker will be listened to (or heard). The
legislative nature of the process is at least partly political, and the determination
of the governing body need not be supported by a preponderance of the evidence,
but only by substantial evidence upon the whole record. Would not the property
owner be as well protected by the public notice required to be given of the elec-
tion, combined with his opportunity to take the matter to the people to be heard?
Clearly if the ordinance is adopted, but is unreasonable, the safeguards of judicial
review remain.
22. In Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954),
cited in the Donohue opinion, it was held that the initiative process did not apply
to a zoning amendment; but in that case the notice and hearing requirement was
imposed by statute, and clearly limited the power of the local governing body to
act, whereas in Donohue notice and hearing were imposed by an ordinance coequal
to the ordinance proposed. Several cases have, however, suggested that notice
and hearing are basic requirements, even in the absence of statute. See, e.g.,
Wood v. Town of Avondale, 72 Ariz. 217, 232 P.2d 963 (1951); Berrata v. Sales,
82 Cal. App. 324, 255 Pac. 538 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Makrauer v. Board of Ad-
justment, 200 Okla. 285, 193 P.2d 291 (1948).
23. 366 S.W.2d 495 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
1963]
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action was brought to compel her to examine and certify the petitions.
The city clerk asserted that the ordinance was administrative and not
legislative in character, and therefore the referendum procedure did not
apply to it. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that the Kansas
City Charter specifically enumerated those matters not subject to the
referendum and that this ordinance was not among the matters exempted;24
further, there was no basis in the charter for distinguishing between
"administrative" and "legislative" ordinances. The judgment of the trial
court in favor of the respondent was reversed and the cause was remanded
with directions to issue the writ of mandamus.
II. COUNCILMEN, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
A common provision in constitutions and charters is that a legislative
body "shall be sole judge of the qualifications, election and returns of its
own members." 25 Where such provisions are found in a constitution, the
courts will not entertain an action challenging the qualifications of a
legislator.26 However, where, as in St. Louis, a city charter provides that
the board of aldermen "shall be the judge of the qualifications of its
members," what attitude should the courts take toward a judicial action
challenging such qualifications? The question was raised, and answered, in
State ex inf. Dalton v. Harris, 7 a quo warranto action challenging the
right of respondent to serve as an alderman after he had ceased to be a
resident of the ward from which elected, in violation of the Charter of
the City of St. Louis. Respondent invoked the charter provision that the
board of aldermen was the judge of his qualifications and denied that the
court had jurisdiction to act. The circuit court dismissed the petition,
but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the St. Louis board
of aldermen is not a coordinate branch of government with the courts, 28
24. The court said at 366 S.W.2d at 497-98:
These exempted matters are: (1) any emergency ordinance; (2) any
ordinance calling for any election; (3) or for the submission of any pro-
posal to the people; (4) any ordinance making any appropriation for the
payment of principal or interest in the public debt; (5) or for current
expenses of the city government; (6) any general appropriation ordinance;
and (7) any ordinance relating to any public improvement to be paid
for by special assessment.
25. Mo. CoNsT. art. III, § 18.
26. Cf. Preisler v. Doherty, 364 Mo. 596, 265 S.W.2d 405 (En Banc 1954).
27. 363 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1962).
28. 'Limiting the language of State ex rel. Vogel v. Bersch, 83 Mo. App. 657
(St. L. Ct. App. 1900).
[Vol. 28
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but is subordinate, and "does not stand on an equality with the General
Assembly as an essential part of the legislative department of this state.120
Therefore, unless it clearly appeared from the charter that the board had
the exclusive right to determine the qualifications of the aldermen, thereby
divesting the courts of jurisdiction,30 the quo warranto action was proper.
Examining the charter language, the court concluded that no purpose was
expressed to deprive the courts of jurisdiction.
Fisher v. City of Iudependence3l involved an appeal by the city
from an order of the Industrial Commission dismissing the claim of a city
employee to enable him to pursue his common law remedies against the
city. In 1929 or 1930 the city elected to bring itself within the workmen's
compensation law, and in 1936 it became a self-insurer by posting a $3,000
security deposit. However, in 1949 the Attorney General issued an opinion
to the effect that the statute permitting municipalities to elect workmen's
compensation coverage was unconstitutional, and the Industrial Commission
notified the city that its acceptance of the act was void, and that the
security deposit was being released. Early in 1950, after the Attorney General
had reversed his position and issued a new opinion that the statute was
valid after all, the Industrial Commission notified the city that its coverage
would be reinstated upon the filing of $10,000 security. Although the city
did not post such security, nevertheless it apparently continued to believe
it was a self-insurer under the workmen's compensation law. Thereafter,
the claimant-employee was injured and brought a tort action against the
city; the action was dismissed upon the city's motion alleging it to be
covered by the law. Claimant then filed a workmen's compensation claim
and was granted an award which was not satisfactory to him; 3 2 subsequently
the claimant discovered that the city had not posted its security as re-
quired, and moved that the claim be dismissed. The Industrial Commission
granted the motion; the city appealed and the Kansas City Court of
29. 363 S.W.2d at 584.
30. Because the case was determined by interpretation of the charter provi-
sion, it was not necessary to consider the further, more fundamental question of
whether the jurisdiction of the courts could be defeated by a charter provision.
31. 370 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
32. The claimant was awarded $3,683.75, but it was held by the commission
that from this sum there should be subtracted $3,069 paid the claimant as wages
by the city after the injury was sustained, leaving a net award of only $614.75.
For this reason the chairman of the Industrial Commission took the position that
the claimant's motion to dismiss the claim "smacks of sour grapes and should be
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Appeals reversed,8 3 holding that the city's status as a self-insurer under
the law could not be terminated without formal action by the commission,
including notice and hearing. The claimant then filed a motion to transfer
the cause to the Missouri Supreme Court, which the supreme court granted.3 4
In an en banc decision the supreme court upheld the Industrial Commis-
sion's determination on the ground that the commission had authority,
under its rules and the law, to require the posting of $10,000 security, and
when the city failed to post such security, its self-insurance authority
terminated automatically, without any notice or hearing being necessary.
Further, inasmuch as the city had misrepresented that it was a self-insurer
under the law, the claimant's filing of his workmen's compensation claim
did not constitute a binding election on his part, and he was free to pursue
his common law remedy.35 In short, for a period of nearly ten years the
city overlooked the fact that it had not complied with the workmen's
compensation law, and this oversight destroyed the city's protection under
the law.36
III. TAXATION AND LICENSING
In 1963 the Missouri General Assembly enacted legislation authoriz-
ing Kansas City to adopt, by charter amendment and ordinance, an earn-
ings tax of one-half of one percent per year upon compensation paid indi-
33. Fisher v. City of Independence, 350 S.W.2d 268 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
34. Pursuant to Mo. CoNsT. art V, § 10; Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.05.
35. See § 287.280, RSMo 1959, providing for insurance or self-insurance by
the employer: "If the employer fails to comply with this section, an injured em-
ployee or his dependents may elect after the injury to recover from the employer
as though he had rejected this chapter [common law liability], or to recover under
this chapter with the compensation payments commuted and immediately payable."
36. During the period under study, two other decisions touched upon the
rights of city employees. In Davis v. Long, 360 S.W.2d 307 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962),
where a suspended police officer was told that he would be restored to duty without
loss in rank and without a departmental trial, but with loss of pay during the
suspension, it was held that by returning to work under these conditions the
officer settled and compromised his dispute with the board of police commis-
sioners, and that he could not thereafter demand to be paid for the period of
suspension. The officer's alternative would have been to stand departmental trial,
in which he might have been reinstated with full pay and without reduction in
rank-but in which he might also have been found guilty and dismissed from the
force.
Heusmann v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 42 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963), involved an
appeal from a finding by the board of trustees of the St. Louis police retirement
system that claimant's heart condition was not caused by an accident in the per-
formance of his duties; the board's finding, being supported by competent and sub-
stantial evidence upon the whole record, was affirmed.
[Vol; 28
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viduals and the net profits of businesses.37 The Kansas City voters have
since approved the necessary charter amendment, and Kansas City has
joined St. Louis38 in the levying of an earnings tax upon businesses and
persons employed within the city. Whether in the future the General
Assembly will extend this form of taxation to other municipalities is, of
course, uncertain; but arguably where a substantial number of persons who
are employed in a city live elsewhere, this is an equitable method of
taxation.
The application of the St. Louis earnings tax to Illinois residents em-
ployed by the federal government in St. Louis was challenged in Arnold v.
Berra.3 ' Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that he was
subject to Illinois taxes which -duplicated the earnings tax, and that the
earnings tax ordinance was void because it deprived nonresident workers
of property "without any corresponding benefit," and therefore violated
due process, and because it placed "an undue burden on interstate com-
merce." The Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, affirmed a circuit court judg-
ment dismissing plaintiff's action; it was held that the tax was an income
tax which might validly be charged to nonresidents and did not constitute
either a "privilege tax" upon nonresidents, or an infringement upon inter-
state commerce. Further, it was pointed out that St. Louis did provide
certain benefits for nonresident workers, such as fire and police protection
and the use of the city's streets and other facilities.
On the other hand, in Village of Be-Nor v. Barnett,4° the supreme
court held invalid, as an undue burden on interstate commerce, an ordinance
requiring the purchase of a solicitor's license by a door-to-door magazine
salesman who took orders for magazines published outside Missouri, and
forwarded the orders to his employer's St. Louis office, from which they
were sent on to Ohio. If the order were accepted by the employer, the
magazines would be mailed by their publishers to the subscriber. The
court held that the solicitor was clearly engaged in interstate commerce,
and that the municipal ordinance which imposed the license tax of $15.00
37. §§ 92.210-.300, RSMo 1963 Supp. The legislation authorizes constitu-
tional charter cities of between 450,000 and 700,000 to levy the tax; clearly Kansas
City is the only municipality which now falls, or within the foreseeable future
will fall, within this class.
38. St. Louis is authorized to levy an earnings tax of one per cent. §§ 92.110-
.200, RSMo 1959.
39. 366 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
40. 358 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1962).
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was indistinguishable from ordinances which had been held invalid in
prior decisions."1 The principle of this and similar cases is that where a
salesman solicits orders for goods to be shipped to the buyer from another
state, the transaction is in interstate commerce, and local license taxes
upon the salesman constitute a burden upon interstate commerce; it does
not matter that local salesmen are subjected to a similar licensing require-
ment.' 2
The problem of the validity of city license taxes also arose in City of
Poplar Bluff v. Poplar Bluff Loan & Bldg. Ass'n%43 in which the city sought
to collect a $200 annual license tax under an occupational licensing ordinance
which related to loan companies. Defendant was a savings and loan asso-
ciation operating under chapter 369, RSMo 1959. It was held that de-
fendant was not a "loan company" within the meaning of the ordinance,4'
but was instead an "association" which was expressly subject to a state
tax of two percent on its dividend yield, which tax was "exclusive and in
lieu of all other taxes of whatsoever nature . . . except ad valorem taxes
upon real and tangible personal property and social security, unemploy-
ment compensation and franchise taxes."' 5 Inasmuch as the city's license
tax was a tax, and the city had no power to grant or withhold franchises
to savings and loan associations, the ordinance did not apply to defendant.
Chapter 155, RSMo 1959, enacted in 1959, deals with the taxation of
aircraft, and provides that the state tax commission shall assess aircraft
operated commercially and shall apportion such valuation to the various
taxing districts in which arrivals and departures of the aircraft occur. It
further provides that "when any municipality in this state owns and
operates an airport outside its corporate limits, the valuation determined
hereunder shall also be apportioned to said municipality."'46 The validity of
this proviso was challenged by declaratory judgment in American Airlines,
Inc. v. City of St. Louis,47 where St. Louis had issued tax bills against
41. See, e.g., Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 364 Mo. 1089, 272
S.W.2d 244 (1954).
42. The original United States Supreme Court decision is Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). More recent decisions dealing with
solicitation in interstate commerce include Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc.
v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
43. 369 S.W.2d 764 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
44. See § 94.110, RSMo 1959, authorizing cities of the third class-which in-
cluded Poplar Bluff-to levy and collect a license tax upon loan companies.
45. § 148.520, RSMo 1959.
46. § 155.050, RSMo 1959.
47. 368 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1963).
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aircraft using the municipally owned Lambert-St. Louis Municipal Airport,
which is located beyond the city limits, in St. Louis County.48 The Missouri
Supreme Court held that the proviso was void, in that it fixed an arbitrary
and capricious situs for the taxation of aircraft by the city; the operation
of the airport by the city was in its proprietary function, and provided no
reasonable basis for extraterritorial taxation:
What governmental benefit or protection does City as a mu-
nicipality with powers of local self-government supply extraterri-
torially to plaintiffs, airline companies, or their aircraft, which
could reasonably, lawfully, and constitutionally support the extra-
territorial imposition upon them of City's tangible personal prop-
erty taxation?
We think there is none.4 9
The court emphasized that the airport was a commercial operation by
the city, that the relations between the city and the airline companies
were contractual in nature, and that the services offered by the city at
the airport were only those that any other airport, whether publicly or
privately owned, would furnish.50 In declaring the proviso void, the court
spoke with pointed reference to the facts of the case before it; whether
there could exist sufficient facts upon which to base this extraterritorial
power of taxation in any other case is, however, questionable."
48. The action also involved the validity of taxes levied by St. Louis County
under chapter 155, RSMo 1959; the circuit court's determination that such taxes
were valid was not appealed.
49. 368 S.W.2d at 165-66.
50. As to the city's argument that it supplied police protection through
private guards and four St. Louis County police officers for whose services the city
paid, the court -pointed out that the airport was within the county's police juris-
diction, and that this extra police protection for the airport was made necessary
only because of the operation by the city of "its airport business."
51. The case presented a further interesting question of local tax law. When
the airlines filed their declaratory judgment action in December 1960, they paid
into the registry of the circuit court the 1960 city and county taxes allegedly due,
which were not at that time delinquent. By the time the circuit court rendered
its judgment that the county taxes were valid, such taxes were clearly delinquent;
the circuit court, however, declined to award statutory interest, penalties and
other delinquent charges to the county. The supreme court reversed this de-
termination, holding that even if it assumed that a court, "in the exercise of its
equitable jurisdiction, has the power to relieve a taxpayer from the statutory de-
linquency penalties in the meritorious circumstances of a case," there was no
sufficient ground here for the exercise of such power. 368 S.W.2d at 168. Although
the taxes had been paid into the registry of the court, nevertheless St. Louis
County, the taxing authority, had been denied use of such moneys during the
pendency of the action.
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IV. BONDS AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
Where the voters have authorized a municipality to issue bonds for a
specific purpose, how soon thereafter must the municipality exercise such
power? In Petition of City of St. LoUis,52 sewer bonds of $7,957,000 were
authorized by the city's electorate on August 1, 1944, and within the next
decade $3,750,000 of such bonds were offered for sale. On April 16, 1962,
nearly eighteen years after the authorization, the city filed its petition
for a pro forma decree declaring the validity of the proposed issuance of
the remaining $4,207,000 in bonds. The circuit court issued its decree in
favor of the city and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
a mere lapse in time does not, in the absence of a substantial change in
conditions, defeat the power of a municipality to issue bonds which
have been authorized by the voters. Nor did the formation of the Metro-
politan St. Louis Sewer District during the intervening years, to exercise
jurisdiction over all existing sanitary and storm-water sewers in St. Louis,
destroy the power of the city to issue the bonds.
In 1960, the Missouri Constitution was amended to enable munic-
ipalities to issue revenue bonds for the purchase or construction of in-
dustrial plants,53 and to enable municipalities in counties of less than
400,000 to issue general obligation bonds for the same purpose."' Pur-
suant thereto, the 1961 session of the Missouri General Assembly en-
acted implementing legislation. 55 State ex rel. City of El Dorado Springs
v. Holman" was an original mandamus proceeding in the supreme court
to compel the state auditor to register and certify an issue of general
obligation bonds under the constitutional amendment and the implement-
ing legislation." The respondent, in the role of devil's advocate, challenged
the validity both of the constitutional amendment and of the legislation
authorizing the issuance of such bonds, contending that the constitutional
amendment had improperly submitted two amendments as one, since
52. 363 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
53. Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 27.
54. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 23(a).
55. §§ 71.790-.850, RSMo 1963 Supp.
56. 363 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
57. § 108.240, RSMo 1959, provides that before any bond issued by a mu-
nicipality or other local governmental unit "shall obtain validity or be negotiated,
such bonds [sic] shall first be presented to the state auditor, who shall register the
same.., and who shall certify by indorsement of such bond that all conditions of
the laws have been complied with in its issue." Such registration and certification
shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the bond.
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both the revenue bond provision and the general obligation bond provision
had been coupled in a single proposal; that the title of the proposition on
the ballot had exceeded twenty-five words, as a maximum set by legis-
lation,5" and did not properly describe the amendment; and that the
enabling legislation was inconsistent with the constitutional amendment,
in that its language was broader in several respects. The court upheld
the constitutional amendment against these challenges, holding that both
bond provisions were germane, and might properly be treated as a single
subject,5 that the twenty-five word limitation upon ballot titles is directory
and not mandatory, and that the title accurately expressed in general terms
the subject matter of the amendment, since it was not necessary to
"descend into particularities." On the other hand, the court found some
difficulty with the implementing legislation, inasmuch as the constitution
provided only that industrial plants purchased or constructed with moneys
derived from revenue bonds might be leased, while the legislation purported
to permit municipalities to "sell or otherwise dispose of" such properties. °0
However, the court found that the discrepancies in the enabling legislation
were not such as to affect the validity of the bonds in this case, inasmuch
as the statutory provisions were clearly severable."1
58. § 125.030, RSMo 1959.
59. This conclusion is based in large part upon the court's determination that
the submission of both bonding matters in a single proposal was justified by Mo.
CONST. art. XII, § 2(b): "No such proposed amendment shall contain more than
one amended and revised article of this constitution, or one new article which shall
not contain more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith."
Since the general subject of the proposal was the issuance of bonds for the financing
of industrial development, the court held that "'matters properly connected there-
with' would reasonably include provisions authorizing the issuance of different
types of bonds." 363 S.W.2d at 556. While the construction is not entirely un-
strained, nonetheless the question presented is a difficult one, and the court should
not overturn a constitutional amendment approved by the people unless there is
some very clear reason for so doing.
60. § 71.850, RSMo 1963 Supp. This section and § 71.847 were subject to the
further objection that they permitted the leasing of plants for other than in-
dustrial development purposes, while there was some question as to the validity
of § 71.793, which did not distinguish between municipalities authorized to issue
general obligation bonds, which were restricted by Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 23(a),
to those located in counties of less than 400,000, and municipalities issuing revenue
bonds, which were subject to no such restriction. Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 27.
61. See also Petition of Monroe City, 359 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. En Banc 1962),
which held that Mo. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 23(a) and 27 were not self-executing and
therefore the fact that the city took action to issue industrial development bonds
prior to the effective date of the implementing legislation was fatal to the validity
of such bond issues. Cf. State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Holman, 355 S.W.2d
946 (Mo. En Banc 1962), which held an emergency clause in the implementing
legislation to be invalid because no true emergency existed, in the constitutional
sense; therefore the legislation did not become effective immediately upon signature
by the governor, but only after ninety days. See Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 29.
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V. STREETS AND SEWERS
Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Kansas City Transit, I=.,62 was a
declaratory judgment action brought to determine the respective obligation
of the parties to contribute to the maintenance of certain viaducts and
subways in Kansas City. Ordinances enacted in 1909 and 1911 granted
Terminal Railway a 200 year franchise and required it to construct and
maintain viaducts or subways for streets which it crossed; however, it was
provided that any streetcar line which used the viaducts or subways should
be required to pay Terminal one-half the cost thereof, plus one-half of
the subsequent maintenance "for the period of such use." In 1917, Kansas
City Transit, which operated streetcar lines upon some of the viaducts and
subways maintained by Terminal, entered into a written contract with
Terminal in settlement of all rights and obligations with respect to certain
viaducts and subways, whereby Terminal agreed to pay two-thirds and
Transit one-third of the cost of future maintenance thereof. Thereafter,
pursuant to a 1937 ordinance, Transit substituted motorbuses for its street-
cars; and Transit contended that under the ordinances and the contract,
having discontinued the streetcars, it no longer was obligated to pay for
maintenance of the viaducts and subways. Terminal then sought a declara-
tion of the rights of the parties. A judgment of the circuit court in favor of
Terminal was affirmed by the supreme court, en banc, which held in an
opinion by Judge Hyde that the term "streetcar line" in the ordinances
should not be given a narrow, technical meaning, but might include other
forms of public conveyance; 63 this was reinforced by the language of the
1917 contract, which did not mention tracks or streetcars, but placed an
unconditional duty upon Transit to pay one-third of the maintenance cost.
Thus, Transit's duty did not depend upon the continued operation of
streetcars, but instead upon the continued use of the viaducts and sub-
ways as a common carrier engaged in the transportation of passengers5
62. 359 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
63. The court also emphasized that the 1937 ordinance was expressly for the
purpose of substituting motorbuses for streetcars; "it was understood and author-
ized that the buses were to be used for the same purpose as the streetcars.' 359
S.W.2d at 706.
64. With respect to city streets, Rentfro v. Wheelock Bros., Inc., 364 S.W.2d
55 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962), was an action by a property owner for damages to a
Chinese elm tree growing on the parkway, or parking, in front of his house when
its branches were struck and broken by defendant's truck. The court acknowl-
edged that the property owner has certain rights in the trees growing in the park-
way, and that an action for damages for their destruction could be maintained,
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Two other reported cases dealt with the duties of a railroad with respect
to the construction of sewers under its roadbed and with respect to the
apportionment of the cost of underpasses in municipalities. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. Co. v. North Kansas City,65 held that the statutory requirement that
a railroad construct sewers beneath its right of way in municipalities of
less than 30,000 population, upon request of the municipal legislative
body, 6 applied only to storm water sewers, and therefore where the mu-
nicipal sewer was for storm and sanitary purposes, the railroad had no duty
to engage in such construction. State ex rel. City of Neosho v. Public Service
Commissio067 held, in reviewing a P.S.C. order apportioning twenty-
five percent of the cost of an underpass to the railroad and seventy-five
percent to the city, that there is no inflexible formula for apportioning
such costs; and where the order is supported by competent and substantial
evidence upon the whole record it will be upheld, even though the cost
ratio is somewhat different from that which is normally set.
The control, regulation and supervision of municipal sewers and
sewage disposal facilities is within the police function of the municipality;
and it is axiomatic that a municipality cannot surrender, contract or
bargain away its police power. Accordingly, it was held in North Kansas
City School District v. J. A. Peterson-Renner, Inc., s that it was reversible
error to give an instruction in a condemnation action that in ascertaining
the fair market value of the land the jury might consider the property
owner's exclusive right, under an agreement with a municipality, to use
the municipal sewage disposal plant.69 Inasmuch as the municipality had
no power to enter into such an agreement, the property owner had no ex-
clusive or superior right to the use of the disposal plant, but only such
rights as other citizens possessed to use the plant. Accordingly, the con-
demnation award could not be based upon any "right" to use the disposal
plant, although the availability of sewers generally might be considered
by the jury in its determination.
but held that here plaintiff failed to establish any negligence on the part of
defendant's truck driver.
65. 367 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1963).
66. §§ 389.670-.690, RSMo 1959.
67. 367 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1963).
68. 369 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. 1963).
69. The property owner, who was engaged in subdividing a large tract of land,
had conveyed the sewage disposal plant to the City of Gladstone, and the city had
agreed that until a specified number of sewer connections had been made by the
property owner, no other connections would be permitted by the city.
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VI. TORT LABILITY
It seems plain that the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liabil-
ity, which extends to municipal functions of a governmental nature, is
of judicial creation.70 And it may be argued that what the courts create,
also may they abrogate; a number of courts in other states have recently
so held. The Missouri courts, however, have repeatedly taken the position
that termination of governmental tort immunity is properly a matter
for the legislature. This position was reaffirmed in Fette v. City of St.
Louis,71 a wrongful death action by the widow of a fireman killed while
fighting a fire. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld a dismissal of the
petition, stating that fire fighting is a governmental function, and therefore
the immunity doctrine was applicable. The suggestion that the doctrine
of immunity be abandoned, at least in the area of municipal employment,
was rejected:
[W]hatever is done to change the doctrine of governmental immu-
nity should be done by the legislature and not by the courts....
It will be necessary to use public funds to settle claims or pay
judgments and only the legislature can properly provide for their
collection by taxation, authorize expenditures for liability insurance,
create methods of payments similar to workmen's compensation
or establish the other safeguards. . . . Our governmental units
are all now operating financially on the basis of our long estab-
lished precedents and our conclusion is that we should not abolish
this doctrine by judicial fiat.12
Missouri municipalities are, of course, liable for torts arising out of
their proprietary functions. And while the courts have been reluctant to
abolish the immunity doctrine altogether, they have shown a willingness
to restrict immunity to those activities which are unquestionably govern-
mental. Recent decisions have demonstrated that whenever there is any
plausible argument for holding an activity to be proprietary, the courts
have done so, and on this basis have denied immunity to municipalities.
Scltweikert v. Kansas City73 is a case in point. This was an action for
personal injuries and property damage caused when a city street cleaning
70. See Comment, Torts-Municipal Corporations-Municipal "Governmetal"
Tort Immunity Doctrine in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 224 (1962), for a discussion
of the leading Missouri decisions.
71. 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963).
72. Id. at 448.
73. 358 S.W.2d 425 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
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truck with defective brakes struck the rear of plaintiff's automobile.
Street cleaning is plainly a governmental function, and had the matter
rested there, plaintiff could not have prevailed. However, the evidence
showed that the street cleaning truck was serviced and repaired by the
city maintenance garage, and that the collision could be attributed to
faulty maintenance of the truck. It was held that, since the operation of
a city maintenance garage is a proprietary and not a governmental func-
tion,7 4 the defense of governmental immunity was unavailable to the city.7s
Injuries resulting from defective conditions in municipal streets and side-
walks normally give rise to a number of appellate decisions each year.
Most of these cases arise from a limited number of factual patterns, and
are decided upon the basis of familiar principles of law. Thus in Fields v.
Kansas City,7 6 an action for personal injuries caused by a fall into an
open manhole in an alley after dark, an order granting a new trial was
affirmed because of an erroneous verdict-directing instruction that the city
bad a duty to maintain its alleys in a reasonably safe condition, and that
it had a duty to keep the manhole covered. This instruction imposed too
great a burden upon the city; properly it should have stated that the
city had a duty to use ordinary care to maintain its alleys in a reason-
ably safe condition for travel, and it should not have stated that the
city had a duty to keep the manhole covered, inasmuch as "there are
other ways to keep a manhole reasonably safe for travel."77 And in Seitter
v. City of St. Josephk78 the court held that whether the city was negligent
in permitting a rut one and one-half inches deep and four and one-half
inches wide to exist in a pedestrian crosswalk was a question for the jury
under all the circumstances of the case, inasmuch as the courts will not "de-
74. Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. 1960): "[Wle are
of the opinion that, when the city elected to own and operate a garage for the
maintenance and repair of its motor vehicles, it entered the area of proprietary
functions, and not governmental, and may be liable for the negligence of its em-
ployees in the operation of the garage." In that case a petition for wrongful death
of a city mechanic while servicing a garbage truck was held to state a cause of
action against the city.
75. See also Myers v. City of Palmyra, 355 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1962), where
the court held that although street sweeping is a governmental activity, removing
snow from the streets is proprietary, and therefore the immunity doctrine did not
extend to a person struck by a city tractor engaged in removing snow.
76. 358 S.W.2d 96 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
77. Id. at 99. The question of proper instructions also arose in Stratton v.
Kansas City, 362 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1962), an action for personal injuries resulting
from a fall upon a snow-covered sidewalk.
78. 358 S.W.2d 263 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
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termine liability or nonliability of the city, as a matter of law, solely by
applying a linear measure to the depth of the street defect, without taking
into account any other attendant factor or condition." 9 Further, citing the
old maxim that "a pedestrian need not be a sidewalk inspector," the court
held that whether plaintiff was contributorily, negligent in stepping into
the rut was also a jury question. A pedestrian was, however, held contrib-
utorily negligent as a matter of law in Drury v. City of St. Louis,0 where
on a rainy night he attempted to jump over the parkway, from the side-
walk to the street, but failed to look, and fell when he caught his foot
on a low iron railing running along the sidewalk.
The construction of new streets and highways gives rise to many
potentially serious municipal problems. One significant problem was man-
ifested in Treon v. City of Hamilton,," where a state highway running
through the city had been relocated, and a drainage ditch dug across the
old route at the point where it would have joined the new highway. No
lights, warning signs or barricades were placed on the old route to indi-
cate the danger. Decedent, who was traveling through the city, drove
along the old highway and was killed when his vehicle ran into the ditch
which had been cut across it. The city argued that the State Highway De-
partment had relocated the highway and dug the ditch, and that therefore
no negligence on the city's part had been shown. The supreme court,
however, held that the city's duty to use ordinary care to maintain its
streets in a reasonably safe condition was non-delegable, and that here
there was sufficient evidence to make a submissible case for plaintiff on
the negligence of the city because of the failure to erect a barricade or
warn travelers upon the old highway of the danger.82
Flanigan v. City of Springfield"3 was an action for damages for a tem-
porary nuisance resulting from the operation of a city sewage disposal
plant. Pursuant to a bond issue, the city constructed an activated sludge
79. Id. at 265.
80. 367 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1963).
81. 363 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1963).
82. The supreme court affirmed an order of the circuit court granting a new
trial after a defendant's verdict because one of the city's instructions submitted
that defendant was contributorily negligent if he had failed to keep his automobile
"under control under the circumstances then and there existing." This instruction
was erroneous as being a submission of general negligence only; it should have
hypothesized the antecedent negligent act or omission of decedent which caused
the loss of control. Cf. Miles v. Gaddy, 357 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
83. 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962).
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treatment plant on a forty-acre tract in a rural area; the operation of the
plant created hydrogen sulphide and other gases which caused noxious
odors, irritated mucous tissue of the eyes, noses and throats of nearby
residents, and caused discoloration and deterioration of the paint upon
their houses. From a judgment for the plaintiffs, the city appealed, con-
tending that, because plaintiffs had not shown that it was scientifically
and reasonably possible for the city to have abated the nuisance, the
action should have been for damages for a permanent nuisance, and not
a temporary one. The supreme court affirmed the judgment, pointing out
that an action for temporary nuisance is proper where there is evidence
that it was "scientifically possible and reasonably practicable" for the city
to have operated its plant so as to have prevented the escape of noxious
gases. Here, there was testimony that the consulting engineers employed
by the city had stated there would be no odor from the operation of the
plant, and further that during the period complained of the plant had
been operated "by guess and by gosh because certain of the control fea-
tures were not operating correctly."8 4 Under this evidence there was a
jury question as to whether the city could, scientifically and practically,
have operated its plant free from the odors.m5
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF ORDINANCES
From the judicial point of view, prosecutions for municipal ordinance
violations are something of an unhappy stepchild. Neither wholly criminal
nor wholly civil in nature, they occupy that no-man's land labeled "quasi-
criminal." True, the fines and imprisonments levied by municipal courts
are, from the offender's point of view, indistinguishable from those imposed
by magistrate and circuit courts in criminal cases;88 but inasmuch as only
84. Id. at 702, 704.
85. One other noteworthy municipal tort decision was handed down. Taylor
v. Kansas City, 361 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. En Banc 1962), was an action for personal
injuries by a child who was injured when he fell backwards into an unfenced wad-
ing pool in a city park while chasing a baseball; it was held that the city is not
an insurer of the safety of children in parks, but owes only a duty to use ordinary
care to maintain its parks in a reasonably safe condition. This case is discussed
more fully in McCleary, Torts in Missouri, infra.
86. Considering the nature of some of the city jails and lockups in this state,
it is not surprising that offenders have been heard to express a preference for be-
ing criminally prosecuted in magistrate court over the "civil" prosecution in the
municipal court; the county jail is seen by them to be a more hospitable place.
On the other hand, the condition of many county jails is deplorable; some accused
persons have been known to express a preference for the state penitentiary over
the county jail-even in light of the fact that the minimum penitentiary sentence
in their case was at least a year longer than the maximum jail sentence.
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the legislature can declare certain conduct to constitute a crime, proceed-
ings for municipal ordinance violations fall to the civil side of the spectrum.
Nevertheless, in certain respects the procedure in municipal courts is sub-
ject to the same safeguards as criminal procedure.
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.18, relating to municipal courts, pro-
vides that "The information or complaint shall be a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged." ' It is further provided that in traffic cases the Uniform Traffic
Ticket shall be used;"" the uniform ticket contains a number of blanks to be
filled in or boxes to be marked, which describe the offense.89 In City of Ray-
town v. Roach,0 defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance "Prohib-
iting Careless, Wreckless [sic] and Imprudent Driving." The traffic ticket was
unmarked except for the inscription "C & I ACC." The Kansas City Court
of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that no legal meaning could
be given to the symbols on the ticket; but that even if the court could
speculate that the charge was "careless and imprudent driving-resulting
in an accident," this statement was still only a conclusion of law, and
did not comply with Rule 37.18 requiring a statement of facts. The court
stressed that the sufficiency of municipal court informations should be
tested by the standards of civil procedure.
A somewhat similar problem was presented, but not answered, in
City of St. Joseplk v. Roller,9' where the information simply charged that
the defendant violated "Section 12-12, Chapter 315, Municipal Code of
the City of St. Joseph . . . by then and there in said City of St. Joseph,
Missouri, Violation city code Barber Law 12-12-315, at 7110 King Hill, 7:04
A.M. '0 2 The municipal court dismissed the information and the city ap-
pealed to circuit court, which sustained defendant's motion to dismiss on
the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional, although the ordinance
itself was not introduced in evidence. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court
reversed, holding that it could not take judicial notice of the ordinance,
87. Compare Mo. R. CaiM. P. 24.01: "The indictment or the information
shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts con-
stituting the offense charged."
88. Mo. S. Or. RULEs 37.18, 37.46, 37.1162.
89. The form of the Uniform Traffic Ticket is set out in Mo. S. CT. RULE
37.1162.
90. 360 S.W.2d 741 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
91. 363 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1963). Cf. City of Rolla v. Riden, 349 S.W.2d 255(Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
92. Id. at 610.
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and therefore, since the ordinance itself was not in the record, the record
on appeal was inadequate. The circuit court had, however, acted erroneously
in declaring the ordinance unconstitutional when the ordinance was not in
evidence. On the other hand, the supreme court did not advert to the suf-
ficiency of the information in this case, although on principle, in view of
Rule 37.18, it would not appear that mentioning an ordinance by number
constitutes a "statement of the essential facts."93
While the information in an ordinance violation prosecution is to
be construed by civil standards, and the proceeding itself is quasi-criminal,
in certain respects the procedure followed must conform to the criminal
code and rules. Thus where an appeal is taken from the municipal court
to circuit court and a trial de novo is held, it "shall be in the nature of
a criminal appeal from a magistrate. '9 Employing criminal procedure
standards, the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Kansas City v. Martin.9
reversed a conviction of soliciting for immoral purposes on the ground
that the city's verdict-directing instruction erroneously described the date
of the offense as "on or about the 29th day of May," while all of the
evidence related to the night of the 29th of March. This typographical
error left the court in substantial doubt as to whether the defendant had
not been prejudiced thereby.
The proper qualification and use of the radar speedmeter was outlined
in an instructive opinion by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in City of St.
Louis v. Boecker,96 where a St. Louis attorney appealed a municipal speed-
ing conviction. The arresting officer testified that when defendant's car
passed through the beam from the speedmeter, it indicated a speed of 40
miles per hour; further, he testified that on the day of the arrest he had
tested the radar speedmeter through the use of a tuning fork, but did not
indicate how long prior to the arrest such test had been made. The court
of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the city had failed to
sustain its burden of proving that the radar speedmeter was working prop-
erly at the time defendant's vehicle passed through the beam. Pointing out
that the normal procedure used by the Missouri State Highway Patrol is
93. Kansas City v. Wiskur, 343 S.W.2d 89 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961). See also
City of St. Louis v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 317 Mo. 907, 296 S.W. 993 (1927);
City of St. Louis v. Ameln, 235 Mo. 669, 139 S.W. 429 (En Banc 1911).
94. § 98.020, RSMo 1959.
95. 369 S.W.2d 602 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
96. 370 S.W.2d 731 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
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to test the radar speedmeter with a tuning fork both immediately prior to
use and immediately thereafter, and to run a test car through the beam
twice,0 7 the court observed that it had been unable to find a case in which
the use of the tuning fork alone to test the instrument had been sufficient.
Moreover, in this case since the evidence did not show when the tuning
fork had been used to test the speedmeter, or even that the fork itself was
accurate, the burden was not met.
Does the Boecker case mean that the use of a second vehicle to run
through the radar beam is necessary in order properly to qualify the
evidence based upon the reading from the speedmeter dial? If so, the use
of the single-car radar operation is no longer practicable. However, the
opinion suggests that substantiating evidence may come from the arrest-
ing officer, as where he can testify from his observation that the offend-
ing vehicle was traveling at a speed in excess of the legal limit.98
Browning v. City of Poplar Bluff9 was an action to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a city ordinance requiring the screening of junk yards by a fence
at least eight feet high; the petition alleged the ordinance to be "void, un-
constitutional and discriminatory," that the city was threatening multiple
prosecutions, and that unless the injunction issued plaintiffs would suffer
irreparable damage. The circuit court upheld the ordinance and denied a
permanent injunction; on appeal the Springfield Court of Appeals did not
find it necessary to consider the validity of the ordinance, but simply
held that plaintiffs had not made a sufficient showing to entitle them to
injunctive relief in any case. To justify injunctive relief, said the court,
it is not only necessary that the ordinance be void, but also the complainant
must plead and prove either that multiple prosecutions are threatened, or
that irreparable injury to his property rights will result. Here, plaintiffs'
pleading was apparently sufficient, but they failed to prove anything
except a single arrest for violation of the ordinance.
97. Citing State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959). See also
Comment, Arrest in Missouri by the Use of Radar Speedmeters, 24 Mo. L. REy.
196 (1959).
98. The court, however, suggests that such evidence might have been supplied
by the arresting officer having looked at the speedometer of his own vehicle as he
pursued the alleged offender. This would not have been evidence to substantiate
the radar reading, but would have been evidence of speeding at another time and
place, e.g., some seconds thereafter and some feet or blocks away from the scene
of the alleged offense. Rather, the substantiating evidence should have been based
upon an observation of defendant's vehicle contemporaneous with the speedmeter
reading.
99. 370 S.W.2d 179 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
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VIII. ANNEXATION
Both the legislation and the appellate litigation in the past year
relating to annexation by municipalities have been concerned with the
somewhat singular conditions which exist in St. Louis County.00
Legislatively, the General Assembly in 1963 modified to a substantial
degree the annexation law and procedure to be followed by municipalities
in first class counties which have adopted a constitutional charter for
their local government-a category which at present includes only St. Louis
County. Prior to the new legislation, annexation by St. Louis County mu-
nicipalities was similar to that throughout the remainder of the state. Cities
annexed contiguous unincorporated areas by (1) a resolution or ordinance
of the governing body to annex the particular area; (2) obtaining a declar-
atory judgment under the Sawyers Act1 " that the annexation was "reason-
able and necessary to the proper development of the city," and that the
city could furnish normal municipal services to the annexed area within a
reasonable time; and (3) a favorable vote by the electors of the city-but
not of the incorporated area 021--approving the annexation.103 Towns and
villages extended their boundaries by a petition by the town council or
village board of trustees to the county court-in St. Louis County to the
County Council-which might order the boundary extension if it was
found to be "just and proper."10 , The foregoing annexation procedures are
still followed in the state of Missouri outside St. Louis County.
Under the new legislation, the declaratory judgment provisions of the
Sawyers Act apply to towns and villages, and "municipalities of whatsoever
kind," as well as to cities, in first class constitutional charter counties. 0 5
100. The sole exception was City of Hannibal v. Winchester, 360 S.W.2d 371
(St. L. Mo. App. 1962), an appeal from an interlocutory order deleting certain
lands and defendants in a Sawyers Act declaratory judgment proceeding. The
court held that neither the order deleting the lands and parties nor an order
denying a petition by third parties to be added as defendants was appealable,
particularly in view of the "deplorably unsatisfactory" record on appeal, which
failed to indicate who the original defendants were, or which of them had been
dropped from the suit.
101. § 71.015, RSMo 1959.
102. Persons residing in, or owning property in, the unincorporated area pro-
posed to be annexed had no voice in the political determination as to whether the
annexation should take -place. Their only safeguard was through the courts, which
might strike down any unreasonable or unnecessary annexation. With the exception
of St. Louis County, this condition still prevails throughout the state.
103. Constitutional charter cities are the only exception to this procedure.
See, e.g., McConnell v. Kansas City, 282 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1955).
104. § 80.030, RSMo 1959.
105. § 71.860, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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More importantly, the voters in the unincorporated area are given a
voice in the question of annexation; no annexation is valid until approved
by a majority of voters both in the municipality and in the area sought to
be annexed.10, In addition, it is provided that in the event of a unanimous
vote favoring the annexation, both in the municipality and in the unincor-
porated area, further proceedings are unnecessary, but the legislative body
of the municipality shall extend its limits by ordinance pursuant to the
vote.107 Although a unanimous vote appears to be an unlikely prospect,
nevertheless it is plain that in such case the legislature intended that the
Sawyers Act provisions need not be followed. However, it is extremely un-
likely that the General Assembly could in any case divest the courts of
jurisdiction to determine the propriety of an annexation through some form
of judicial proceeding or review. If the owners of all of the property in
the unincorporated area cast their ballots in favor of the annexation, the
possibility of a subsequent judicial attack upon the annexation is not
present. But the normal case will be one where some of the property in
the area proposed to be annexed will be owned by persons who do not
reside in the area, and who therefore have no voice in the election. In view
of the consistent attitude of the courts that annexation should be sub-
ject to some form of judicial review, it seems certain that even in the event
of a unanimous election a nonresident property owner might question the
reasonableness and necessity of the annexation by quo warranto, declaratory
judgment or otherwise.
Turning to the appellate decisions, two cases of considerable consequence
to the future development of St. Louis County were decided. Due to the
metropolitan nature of St. Louis County, which furnishes municipal services
and performs municipal functions in its unincorporated areas, the question
106. § 71.870, RSMo 1963 Supp.
A nice question of statutory interpretation arises from the wording of § 71.880,
which indicates that notice of the intention to annex shall be certified to the
board of election commissioners "before proceeding as otherwise provided by law,"
as compared with § 71.015, which provides that the declaratory judgment action
shall be filed "before proceeding as otherwise authorized by law or charter for
annexation of unincorporated areas." Which is to be done first? Can the election
commissioners refuse to post notice of the election because no declaratory judg-
ment action has been filed? Or can the court refuse to proceed with the declaratoryjudgment action because notice has not been certified to the election commissioners?
To resolve the issue, it might be necessary to resort to the fact that § 71.880 was
enacted after § 71.015, and therefore the legislative intent was that the language
"before proceeding as otherwise provided by law," as included in § 71.880, em-
braced § 71.015.
107. § 71.910, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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has been raised as to whether the same standards for annexation by mu-
nicipalities should be applied in St. Louis County as in the remainder of
the state, where such conditions do not exist. The issue was raised by the
county in the 1960 decision of City of Oliuette v. Graeler,108 but the su-
preme court in that case held that the Sawyers Act language "unincorporated
area" meant just that-any area outside an incorporated municipality. The
fact that the area was in St. Louis County and received the benefit of
the county's services was not to be considered as controlling, although
the existence of such services "should be considered and weighed along with
the other evidence in the case in determining the reasonableness of the
annexation." 10" A general statement of judicial policy was made:
The interest of the county as a community must be weighed against
the claims of the city because the county's municipal powers are
also provided by law and are a part of the public policy of the state.
Attention should be given to the needs of the area for municipal
services, whether they are adequately cared for and whether
they should be supplanted by those of the city.110
In 1963, City of Olivette v. Graelerill again came before the Missouri
Supreme Court, and a circuit court judgment declaring the annexation
'to be proper was reversed with directions to -dismiss the petition. The
court reviewed in detail the services performed by St. Louis County within
the unincorporated area, observed that the county furnished "all normal
municipal services" to the area, and held that "the annexation would
simply impose city taxes upon the residents and property owners of the
area, without the equivalent in added benefits."' 112 Moreover, the facts
showed that the area sought to be annexed was largely industrial in na-
ture, that the area was not available for residential purposes, and that
the development of the area was not attributable to the growth of Olivette,
but to St. Louis County in general. The interests of St. Louis County as a
community were weighed against the interests of Olivette, and the former
were found to prevail: "So long as the County has an effective county
organization, it should not be whittled away to a mere shell by annexations
which have as their prime purpose the acquisition of more city taxes.'
1 3
108. 338 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1960).
109. Id. at 836.
110. Id. at 838.
111. 369 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1963).
112. Id. at 94.
113. Id. at 95.
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Although it is doubtful that the second Grader decision will entirely
inhibit future annexations by St. Louis County municipalities, it is nonethe-
less clear that for all practical purposes such municipalities now have a
very heavy burden to meet in establishing not merely that the particular
annexation is reasonable and necessary with respect to the municipality
and the area to be annexed, but also that it is consonant with the interests
of St. Louis County as a whole.
Another facet of annexation in St. Louis County was disclosed in
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley," 4 in which the city,
operating under its constitutional charter, had annexed Lambert-St. Louis
Municipal Airport and the McDonnell plant. McDonnell and the City of
St. Louis filed a declaratory judgment action attacking the annexation as
unreasonable and void,"5 and the circuit court held for petitioners and en-
joined the city from exercising jurisdiction over the area in question. The
Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the 7,635 pages of transcript which de-
scribed the area sought to be annexed and the need for municipal services
therein, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on the ground that
there was not a sufficient showing of reasonableness to uphold the annexa-
tion. The area was already heavily developed, and could not serve as a
location for future growth of Berkeley: "We cannot find that the airport
area really needs municipal services from Berkeley, or that Berkeley's
control would solve the problems discussed; and it obviously is not an area
which Berkeley can use for commercial, industrial or residential growth."1 6
In short, both the Grader and the McDonnell cases indicate that municipal
annexation in a metropolitan area will be judged largely from the point
of view of the indigenous growth of the annexing municipality itself,
rather than from the point of view of the degree of development or highest
uses of contiguous unincorporated areas. 11
114. 367 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1963).
115. Because the city operated under a constitutional charter it did not file
a declaratory judgment action under the Sawyers Act before the annexation.
Nevertheless, it was held that such action was reviewable by the courts in an
action brought by interested persons, and that the standards laid down in the
Sawyers Act were applicable thereto.
116. Id. at 511.
117. With regard to annexation in St. Louis County, see also Emerson Electric
Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), holding that an allega-
tion by appellant city that the annexation denied by the trial court will result in
a prospective tax loss to the city of more than $15,000, does not give the supreme
court jurisdiction over the appeal.
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IX. PLANNING AND ZONING
The 1963 General Assembly adopted a comprehensive planning statute
which empowers all municipalities to create a city plan for the develop-
ment of land use within the community, including the planning of munic-
ipal streets and public utilities."1 s Municipalities are specifically authorized
to adopt regulations governing the subdivision of land,"-0 and to establish
building setback lines.120 Moreover, after a major street plan has been
adopted by a municipality, the municipality itself may not improve any
subsequently dedicated street which does not conform to the plan,"2 ' and
no buildings may be constructed on any lot which does not have access to
an existing dedicated street, or to a street which is in conformity with the
plan. 22 This legislation appears to have been designed to cover some
areas of city planning in which the powers of municipalities under earlier
statutes were either questionable or nonexistent.
A number of appellate decisions between April 1962 and September
1963 related to zoning problems, both of municipalities and counties.
Several of the cases involved no novel point of zoning law, but simply pre-
sented for appellate review the question of whether the action of the city
council or zoning board had been arbitrary and unreasonable; two of
these decisions affirmed the action of the municipal governing body be-
cause it was not shown that the city council had acted wholly without
cause, 2 3 and one upheld the action of the board of zoning adjustment where
there was substantial evidence upon the whole record to support the board's
118. §§ 89.300-.490, RSMo 1963 Supp.
119. § 89.410, RSMo 1963 Supp. The section deals with the planning and con-
struction of streets and public utilities within subdivisions, and with the "dedica-
tion, reservation or acquisition of lands and open spaces necessary for public uses
indicated on the city plan."
120. § 89.480, RSMo 1963 Supp. The section relates only to "major streets"-
which the statute does not define-and provides that after proposed major streets
have been located upon the city plan, the municipal governing body may prohibit
the construction of new buildings within such street rights-of-way.
121. § 89.460, RSMo 1963 Supp.
122. § 89.470, RSMo 1963 Supp.
123. Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963)
(refusal of city council to rezone ten acres from residential to commercial use was
upheld because the question was "fairly debatable" and therefore court would not
interfere with council's discretion); Miller v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d 100 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1962) (city council's action in rezoning area from residential to com-
mercial was upheld because it could not "be said that the city council clearly acted
arbitrarily, capriciously or unlawfully, or that it did so beyond reasonable doubt").
19631
29
Lauer: Lauer: Municipal Law in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
action. 12 4 In Niumer v. Kansas City,'25 on the other hand, the circuit court
granted a judgment declaring void an ordinance rezoning a tract from
residential to commercial use, to enable construction of a gasoline station.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment,
holding that there had not been a sufficient change in the neighborhood
to permit such rezoning and that the rezoning was "spot zoning," wholly
unrelated to any comprehensive plan.126 Therefore, the rezoning was not
a proper exercise of the city's police powers, as it had no relationship to
the health, safety or morals "of anyone."
A novel question was raised in City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder,'127
where in 1950 the entire area within the city was originally zoned "District
A," single family residential. Thereafter a few scattered lots and tracts
were rezoned for commercial purposes. The city brought action to enjoin
defendants' use of a fifteen-room dwelling as a two-family residential unit,
and the circuit court granted a permanent injunction. Defendants appealed
to the Missouri Supreme Court, contending that the restriction of the
entire municipality to a single-use district "was so arbitrary and unreason-
able as to be violative of the due process clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutons,112s and that the zoning ordinance had not been adopted
pursuant to a "comprehensive plan." The supreme court, in an opinion
by Judge Eager, reversed the circuit court judgment, declaring that the
ordinance had not been enacted pursuant to the powers granted the city
in chapter 89, RSMo. In reaching this conclusion, the court placed con-
siderable emphasis upon section 89.030, providing that "the local legislative
body may divide the municipality into districts." The use of the plural
"districts," combined with the general concept of zoning as a division into
zones, was held to amount to a legislative directive that the legislature did
not intend a single-zone municipality:
We are of the view ... that, considering these statutes as a whole,
in context, and considering their aggregate purpose and intent, it
124. Donelson v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 368 S.W.2d 728 (K.C. Mo. App.
1963). This case raised the further interesting question of whether the board could
appeal from a circuit court judgment which upheld the board's action, but gave
different reasons for its decision than those relied upon by the board; the court
held that the board could not appeal, since the judgment granted it full relief.
125. 365 S.W.2d 753 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
126. § 89.040, RSMo 1959: "Such regulations shall be made in accordance with
a comprehensive plan...."
127. 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1963).
128. Id. at 571.
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was never intended thereby to give to a municipality the power
to adopt a one use district zoning ordinance encompassing the
whole town.129
Accordingly, the city had lacked authority to adopt such a zoning ordi-
nance, and it followed that the attempted restriction of the use of defend-
ants' property was void. 30 The decision may result in large part upon the
particular wording of the Missouri zoning statute; and it may be inquired
whether under this statute the city could not validly have originally adopted
two single-family residential zones, A-1 and A-2, which differed slightly
with regard to lot area, height restrictions, or front, side or rear yard
requirements.
Beckmeyer v. Beug'3' involved an appeal by nearby property owners
from a judgment affirming the decision of the St. Louis zoning board of
adjustment to grant a permit to use certain premises in a residential zone
for hotel purposes. The building had been constructed as a hotel in 1911,
and was used for that purpose until 1920, when it was purchased by Principia
College and used as a student dormitory until 1960. The evidence showed
that the building could not be reasonably used other than as a dormitory
or hotel. The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of the permit,
holding that the decision of the board of adjustment was supported by
substantial evidence, on the ground that to deny the permit would work
an unnecessary hardship to the property owner; in addition, there is lan-
guage in the opinion supporting the finding of the board that dormitory
use, which antedated the zoning ordinance, was essentially hotel use, and
therefore a non-conforming use existed.
Earlier Missouri Supreme Court decisions have established that munic-
ipalities do not have power, through zoning ordinances, to exclude public
schools 3 2 or churches. 33 In Urnstein v. Village of Town and Country,1s4
the power of a municipality to exclude private schools was raised, but
129. Id. at 573.
130. The court also indicated that the record did not show that the zoning
ordinance had been based upon a comprehensive plan, which would have been a
fatal flaw in the ordinance. However, in view of the possibly incomplete state of
the record, the decision was not rested upon this ground.
131. 367 S.W.2d 9 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
132. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferris, 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo.
En Banc 1957). See Comment, Missouri Municipality's Power to Zone Public and
Quasi-Public Uses, 26 Mo. L. REv. 45 (1961).
133. Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo.
1959).
134. 368 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1963).
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only imperfectly. The circuit court had held the ordinance void and un-
constitutional as applied to plaintiff's private school. The supreme court
held that in view of the inadequate record on appeal, which failed to set
forth sufficient evidence to show the nature of the school involved, it could
not say that there was a sufficient relationship between the general welfare
and the prohibition of plaintiffs' school to justify the use of the police
power in this case. The Urnstein case clearly must be limited to its very
facts, and cannot be said to constitute a holding that private schools are
immune from the zoning power of municipalities. Instead, the case points
up the vital necessity of presenting an adequate record on appeal, particularly
for the appellant.
A conflict between the zoning power of a constitutional charter county
and the power of a municipality to construct and operate an extraterritorial
sewage treatment plant was presented to the Missouri Supreme Court in
St. Louis County v. City of Manchester.'ss The city, under statutory au-
thority, had purchased a four-acre tract about a mile outside its city
limits in an area which the county had zoned "B" single-family, and
entered into a contract to construct a sewage treatment plant upon the
tract. The county brought action to enjoin the construction, but the cir-
cuit court dismissed the petition. On appeal to the supreme court, the
county emphasized that its zoning power was derived from the constitu-
tion,136 and therefore was superior to the statutory power possessed by
the city to construct the sewage plant.1 37 The court, in an opinion by Judge
Storckman, found it unnecessary to determine "whether the county or the
city 'occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy. ' ro 3s
Instead, the court considered the city's power in the light of the county's
power to zone, and concluded that the constitutional provisions and the
statutes might be harmonized by holding that the county zoning ordinances
were a lawful restriction upon the city's power to locate its sewage plant
in the unincorporated area of the county 39
135. 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
136. Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 18(c).
137. §§ 71.680, 79.380, RSMo 1959.
138. 360 S.W.2d at 642.
139. This conclusion was aided by § 64.650, RSMo 1959, pertaining to county
zoning, which provides: "If a development or public improvement is proposed to
be located in the unincorporated territory of the county by any municipality,
county, public board or commission, the disapproval or recommendations of the
county planning commission may be overruled by the county court, which shall
certify its reason therefor to the planning commission."
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Finally, the applicability of the general county zoning statute to St.
Louis County was raised in Casper v. Hetlage,140 where it was held that
section 64.140, RSMo 1959, which requires a unanimous vote of the
county court in class one counties to amend the county zoning ordinance,
has no applicability to St. Louis County, which operates under a constitu-
tional charter.
140. 359 S.W2d 781 (Mo. 1962). See also State ex rel. City of Creve Coeur v.
St. Louis County, 369 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1963), which involved the same question.
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